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hose of us who are interested in contemporary Quaker theological
expression, and appropriate means for applying theological
analysis to the vitality of Quakerism today, are indebted to David
Johns for his editorial work on the Collected Essays of Maurice Creasey,
1912-2004.1 Johns’ effort brings to light an able Quaker theological
“centrist”2 whose writings would otherwise be inaccessible to most
scholars, and whose research and influence are under-represented
among the Quaker thinkers of the second half of the 20th Century.
Johns’ collection is a helpful corrective to the tendency of scholars
to look to the first two generations of Quaker insight in the 17th
Century as the only theological voices with something worthy to say.
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Part five of this collection, titled “Quaker Identity,” contains four
essays written between 1962 and 1977. In these four essays Creasey
attempts to name, and correct, what he sees as a theological problem
present in Britain Yearly Meeting, and then suggest two avenues that
he believed could guide Quakers through their predicament and into
a meaningful future, namely, 1) a reinterpretation of the Quaker
message; and, 2) ecumenism. While Creasey was chiefly writing these
four essays to Britain Yearly Meeting Quakers, there is much in them
that applies to Quakers of all stripes today. My review, then, will first
discuss Creasey’s analysis of the theological problem, followed by
his suggested pathways for resolution through reinterpretation of
the Quaker message and ecumenism. I will treat these four essays
as a whole, a move that seems justified considering Creasey’s final
essay in this section, “Rethinking Quakerism,” is in many ways a rearticulation and development of the other three essays, “’Inward’
and ‘Outward’: A Study in Early Quaker Language,” “A Frame of
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I. The Theological Problem

I. The Theological Problem

Creasey believed that Britain Yearly Meeting in his day lacked
“a widely shared sense of purpose, a common vision of what the
Society of Friends exists to be and to do.”3 This organizational and
ecclesiological question Creasey elsewhere applied anthropologically:
what does it mean to be human?4 These two interrelated questions the corporate one of, what is the Quaker organizing principle? And
the anthropological one, what does it mean to be human? - are central
to the challenges and opportunities Creasey contends Quakers must
address if they are to be relevant.5
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At the core of these questions of relevancy, Creasey identifies a
central Quaker theological problem that must be addressed: “the
central, inescapable Quaker theological problem is that of the relation
between the general, universal, inward, divine revelatory activity and
the particular historic revelatory activity focused in Jesus.”6 Creasey
notes that in the first two generations of Friends a certain linguistic
and conceptual looseness has done much to muddy the waters and
is responsible for contemporary misconceptions of the means and
content of revelation. In a study of the first generation’s usage of
terms like “Inward” and “Outward,” Creasey notes that Fox and
others of his generation viewed “Inward” as “obeying the voice of
God in the deep inner places of responsible personal existence,” and
a “personal response to the acts of God in history as interpreted and
transmitted in Scripture.”7 For the first generation of Friends, the
emphasis on the “inward” appropriation of Truth was to say that the
heart of faithfulness must be comprehensive and total and reach into
the deepest crevices of the soul if it were to be real.8 By contrast, the
“outward” was religion kept at arms length; it was to take the message
of the Gospel in words, but to know nothing of it in one’s self.9
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However, Creasey argues that Robert Barclay and William Penn
shifted understandings of “inward” and “outward” language in a
way that minimized the centrality of the historical revelation of Jesus,
affirmed as core Truth by the first generation. Thus, whereas the first
generation considered outward/inward language to be the difference
between a merely formal, conventional knowledge of the Christian
revelation, and that of a transforming acquaintance with that same
revelation, in Barclay it came to signify “a contrast between modes of
revelation, and even a contrast between two distinct organs whereby
these modes of revelation are respectively received.”10 Creasey notes
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that based on this development of a dualism between inward/outward
“it is very difficult to accord any fundamental importance to History
or to Scripture.”11
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In other words, Creasey argues that Barclay and Penn12 changed
the way the first generation used “inward” and “outward” language
to the extent that they viewed the historical revelation of Christ as
important, but not essential to the faith because the real essence of
Truth was an “inward” revelation distinct from historical and physical,
“outward” manifestations.13
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The central theological problem of the relationship between the
universal, inward revelatory activity and the particular, historical
revelatory activity, though, gets to the core of the questions: “Who are
the Quakers, and what are they to do?” And, “what does it mean to
be human in a technological age?” By stating the theological problem
positively, Creasey identifies the central Quaker affirmation, namely,
that “every [person] is enlighten[ed] by the divine light of Christ,”
which “holds together the historically particular emphasis upon Christ
and the universal concern with every [person]. The tension between
the two, and the difficulty of maintaining it”14 helps explain the
events and byways of Quaker history as well as the “wide diversities of
understanding and emphasis among us today.”15
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II. Reinterpretation

II. Reinterpretation

of the

Quaker Message

Thus, Creasey is astute to suggest that the central Quaker theological
problem concerning the nature of revelation, is also the central
affirmation that must be maintained and reinterpreted into a late
20th Century context: Creasey states that to the extent that Quakers
have any prospects, it depends on, first, “whether we as Friends can
discern the ‘condition’ of the contemporary world.”16 And second,
“whether we can speak relevantly and credibly to it.”17 And later,
he stated that the early Quaker synthesis of the historical revelation
of Christ in a transformative inward encounter, reinterpreted into a
modern context, had great possibilities for addressing the fundamental
ecclesioloigcal and anthropological question of the age.18 This act of
“reinterpretation” was central to Creasey’s analysis of the prospects
for Quakerism, and an essential means for addressing the tensions
within Quaker understandings of revelation.
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Creasey’s emphasis on the task of theological reinterpretation is
at once a strong corrective to those who would seek to relive 17th
Century Quakerism, while at the same time a refreshing and hopeful
assessment of what Quakers can offer modern society. In terms of the
corrective, Creasey is clear that modern Quakers cannot relive the
fervor of the 1650s, “this way is closed. We cannot do it; we should
not even try to do it.”19 17th Century Friends lived in a different
thought-world, they assumed the legitimacy of Christendom, which
is no longer a tenable assumption for modern Friends and would only
demonstrate irrelevance.20
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On the other hand, a rethinking, or “re-minting,”21 of the central
affirmation - of “every [person] being enlightened by the divine light
of Christ”22 - Creasey believed could offer a fresh expression of hope
for the world that takes seriously God’s grace and human longings
for fullness. Thus, Creasey advocates that a rethinking of the central
affirmation will understand the “Inner Light,” which Creasey notes
is an “un-Foxian phrase,” not as “a kind of built-in infallibility or
self-sufficiency, but it is, as the first Friends said, grace - capacity or
potentiality for responding to encounter and disclosure.”23 That is,
that the historic revelation of Christ can be known truly and deeply,
that it is of “universal significance,” that this proclamation is not only
of “doctrinal and universal ‘extensive’ significance... [but] is also to
be known in an ‘intensive’ ...inward and experiential manner by each
person.”24 Doing this re-minting, Creasey argues, will permit Quakers
to again speak to the condition of modern day seekers who “make
very little sense of traditional religious concepts and practices, but on
the other hand are totally disillusioned by any merely materialistic,
positivistic concept of Man as the only thing there is... We cannot
speak to them unless we can get away from the traditional language,
but we shall have nothing to say to them, unless we know what that
traditional language means.”25
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III. Ecumenism

III. Ecumenism

Perhaps Creasey’s most distinctive contribution to discussions of
Quaker relevance was his conviction that any Quaker address to the
problem and prospect of the nature of revelation cannot be done in
isolation from the Church as a whole. The kind of rethinking that must
be done, he says, must be done ecumenically because it involves “the
overarching problem of rethinking the Christian faith and tradition
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and experience. If you abstract Quakerism from that, and try to rethink it by itself, I fear that you have nothing worth rethinking.”26
Rather, he believes this rethinking should occur with others who
potentially have things of value to say to Quakers and Quakers can
say to them.27 Creasey believes the Quaker future is bound up with
the “mysterious, perplexing, infuriating and yet altogether to-bethankful-for reality which we call the Church...”28 As David Johns
has argued in an article on Creasey’s ecumenism in the most recent
Quaker Religious Thought, Creasey’s understanding of the possibilities
of ecumenism are intertwined with his ecclesiology, which was open
to the other, and held loosely to many accepted Quaker forms and
traditions.29 Thus, Johns argues that Creasey de-centers Quakerism in
the grand scope of the Church universal, so that his theology of the
Quaker position in relation to the Church is not “self-referential.”30
Because Creasey did not think that the Quakerism of the future
would be an exact replication of the 1650s, but a rethinking of the
central, universal affirmation, he avoids the pitfalls of “restorationist
ecclesiologies” that would re-assert early Quaker antagonism to the
other churches of their day as a “regulative principle” for Quaker
ecclesiology in the present day, which would head off any prospects
for ecumenical dialogue at the outset.31
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However, there is a confusion among Quaker ecclesiologies, Creasey
argues, that hinders ecumenical discussion and, along with it, the hopes
of addressing the central theological problems confronting Quakers.
That is, Quakerism is unable, Creasey maintains, to “understand itself
as a permanent part of the denominational pattern, as the nucleus of
a purely spiritual and ethical world faith, as the comprehensive and
permanent pattern of the true Church, and as a temporary corrective
of certain errors and mistaken emphases which have appeared in the
Church, but which the Church as a whole is now aware of and well
on the way to overcoming.”32 Rather, Creasey’s ecumenism takes
seriously the contributions Quakerism can make to the Church,
while also holding that a sober self-awareness of some facets of
Quaker thought might need to be refined by the critical assessment
of others. This, I think, is precisely the type of “rethinking” that
Creasey envisioned and on which he hangs Quaker prospects. Johns
summarizes Creasey’s ecumenism thus: “Friends may be a contrast
community in terms of practice and theological conviction... however,
Friends are a contrast community only in an interpretive sense, never
in an ontological or an eschatological one.”33 Creasey, Johns argues,
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understood Quakerism to be an important voice in the Church, but
not the only voice, and not the goal of the Church.34 In this way, Johns
makes explicit the manner in which Creasey’s ecumenism provided a
pathway for rethinking the Quaker message in a way that would assert
its relevance to the fundamental questions of the day.35
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makes explicit the manner in which Creasey’s ecumenism provided a
pathway for rethinking the Quaker message in a way that would assert
its relevance to the fundamental questions of the day.35

IV. Conclusion

IV. Conclusion

In conclusion, Johns aptly situates the theological insights of a
largely marginalized Quaker figure and organizes these insights in
a way that brings out Creasey’s continuing relevance.36 As a whole,
Britain Yearly Meeting - and perhaps much of the Quaker world - has
rejected Creasey’s critical analysis of Quaker tradition and prospects
for the future. Whether a reader agrees with Creasey’s analysis or
not, the central theological problem of the balance between the
inward revelation and the historic revelation remains a pressing issue
among Britain Yearly Meeting Quakers, and there is perhaps no finer
articulation of that tension than what is found in Creasey’s writings.
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However, by locating the origination of the theological problem of
revelation solely within the purview of Quaker history and expression
I wonder if Creasey missed an occasion to examine the benefits and
liabilities - if not the inevitability, whether conscious or not - of the
type of ecumenical engagement he advocated. That is, Creasey tended
to look at Quakers from their early moments on in monolithic terms,
as a group that had maintained their theological particularities in a
way isolated from the outside world. To be fair, Creasey did challenge
Quakers to engage reflectively with the leading theological voices of
the day, but not to the extent or depth that might have contextualized
ongoing Quaker theological debates in light of pressing cultural
forces.37 Such an implicit understanding of the isolated transmission
of religious ideas across time must be treated with skepticism.
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In a recent study, for example, Timothy Burdick has demonstrated
that the broader Fundamentalist-Modernist theological debates in the
United States of the early 20th Century were played out in microcosm
in the evangelical Oregon Yearly Meeting.38 In this example, the
strong lean towards fundamentalism was reflected in the development
of Bible schools and a crucicentric theology that often neglected social
manifestations of the gospel in a way similar to other fundamentalist
denominations.39 Quakers were not immune to the larger cultural and
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theological winds of their day, but reflected them in the crafting and
development of their ecclesiology.40

theological winds of their day, but reflected them in the crafting and
development of their ecclesiology.40

It is worth examining whether liberal Friends, likewise, accommodated Quaker theological tradition to the larger social and cultural
currents that have continuously buffeted Quakerism since its inception. Such an occurrence should be expected in any religious group,
and might be just as essential for understanding contemporary religious expressions as are a study of origins. For example, Rufus Jones
(1863-1948) embodied the Modernist turn among liberal Friends,
which remains impactful. Jones described his favored form of religious
expression, mysticism, as “the type of religion which puts the emphasis and immediate awareness of relation with God, on direct and
intimate consciousness of the Divine Presence. It is religion in its most
acute, intense, and living stage.”41 In Jones’ definition, mysticism is a
subjective experience, defined by the human recipient and abstracted
from historical particularity. While Jones was not shy to claim that
his idealized version of religious experience was also that of the first
generation of Quakers,42 on closer examination his view appears a near
representation of the liberal theological developments prevalent in the
late 19th Century. The German theologian Friedrich Schleiermacher
(1768-1834), often called “The Father of Modern Liberal Theology,”
also placed the essence of religion in the inward, subjective experience,43 what he described as the realm of “feeling” and “intuition.”
In fact Schleiermacher rejected any real sense of revelation - in which
God becomes known “as He is in and for Himself” - as an appropriate
foundation for religion because, he though, such a revelation could
not be comprehended.44 If Schleiermacher believed revelation was an
inadequate basis for religious knowledge, he, like Jones after him, filtered experience of God through human subjectivity:
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The whole religious life consists of two elements, that man
surrender himself to the Universe and allow himself to be
influenced by the side of it that is turned towards him is one
part, and that he transplant this contact which is one definite
feeling within, and take it up into the inner unity of his life and
being, is the other. The religious life is nothing else than the
constant renewal of this proceeding.45
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For Schleiermacher, then, the idea of “God” is not rooted in the
transcendent, or the otherness of a revelation that is given, but
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religious experience to “awareness” and emphasized the role of human
“consciousness” in revelation.47 If Oregon Yearly Meeting adopted the
theological fundamentalism of its day, and Jones adopted elements of
the liberal theology of his day, it seems consistent to suggest that all
along its trajectory Quakers have been both inheritors of a theological
tradition rooted in the 17th Century—as Creasey illustrated—as well
as of contemporary social and theological climates. Examined from
that perspective, the task of rethinking British Quakerism that Creasey
laid out in 197748 should include a form of ecumenical theological
reflection in an awareness of the influence liberal theology—as
articulated by Schleiermacher and his interpreters49—has had on
Quakerism, as well as an appraisal of the critiques of liberal theology
readily at hand.50
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Creasey demonstrated himself to be an able theologian whose
contribution and insight have been unfortunately diminished,
but now helpfully resurrected by Johns. These essays are a crucial
starting point for renewed, intentional theological engagement in a
Quaker way. Johns’ collection is recommended as a model of critical
theological inquiry that both takes seriously the theological legacy of
one’s tradition and emphasizes the continuing task of re-minting the
linguistic and conceptual points of one’s faith for a new age.

Creasey demonstrated himself to be an able theologian whose
contribution and insight have been unfortunately diminished,
but now helpfully resurrected by Johns. These essays are a crucial
starting point for renewed, intentional theological engagement in a
Quaker way. Johns’ collection is recommended as a model of critical
theological inquiry that both takes seriously the theological legacy of
one’s tradition and emphasizes the continuing task of re-minting the
linguistic and conceptual points of one’s faith for a new age.

Endnotes

Endnotes

1		 Maurice A Creasey, Collected Essays of Maurice Creasey, 1912-2004: The Social Thought of
a Quaker Thinker, ed. David L Johns (Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen Press, 2011).

1		 Maurice A Creasey, Collected Essays of Maurice Creasey, 1912-2004: The Social Thought of
a Quaker Thinker, ed. David L Johns (Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen Press, 2011).

2		 David Johns, “Maurice Creasey at the Center,” ed. David Johns In Collected Essays of
Maurice Creasey (Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen Press, 2011), xvii.

2		 David Johns, “Maurice Creasey at the Center,” ed. David Johns In Collected Essays of
Maurice Creasey (Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen Press, 2011), xvii.

3		 Creasey believed that any attempt to make structural changes to Yearly Meeting organization would have “little real meaning and value unless it proceeds form a clear and
uniting vision of the Society’s vocation. How can we overhaul our ‘machinery’ unless we
know what that machinery exists to do?” Maurice A Creasey, “A Frame of Reference for
Friends,” in Collected Essays of Maurice Creasey, 1912-2004: The Social Thought of a
Quaker Thinker, ed. David L Johns (Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen Press, 2011), 357.

3		 Creasey believed that any attempt to make structural changes to Yearly Meeting organization would have “little real meaning and value unless it proceeds form a clear and
uniting vision of the Society’s vocation. How can we overhaul our ‘machinery’ unless we
know what that machinery exists to do?” Maurice A Creasey, “A Frame of Reference for
Friends,” in Collected Essays of Maurice Creasey, 1912-2004: The Social Thought of a
Quaker Thinker, ed. David L Johns (Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen Press, 2011), 357.

4		 Maurice A Creasey, “Prospect for Quakerism,” in Collected Essays of Maurice Creasey,
1912-2004: The Social Thought of a Quaker Thinker, ed. David L Johns (Lewiston, N.Y.:
Edwin Mellen Press, 2011), 383–384.

4		 Maurice A Creasey, “Prospect for Quakerism,” in Collected Essays of Maurice Creasey,
1912-2004: The Social Thought of a Quaker Thinker, ed. David L Johns (Lewiston, N.Y.:
Edwin Mellen Press, 2011), 383–384.

5		Maurice A Creasey, “Rethinking Quakerism,” in Collected Essays of Maurice Creasey,
1912-2004: The Social Thought of a Quaker Thinker, ed. David L Johns (Lewiston, N.Y.:
Edwin Mellen Press, 2011), 399.

5		Maurice A Creasey, “Rethinking Quakerism,” in Collected Essays of Maurice Creasey,
1912-2004: The Social Thought of a Quaker Thinker, ed. David L Johns (Lewiston, N.Y.:
Edwin Mellen Press, 2011), 399.

6		Creasey suggests this central theological problem has three dimensions: First, early
Quakers placed at the center of their original proclamation a message that modern
is
Friends do not need to weaken or abandon, “namely, that there a saving revelation;

6		Creasey suggests this central theological problem has three dimensions: First, early
Quakers placed at the center of their original proclamation a message that modern
is
Friends do not need to weaken or abandon, “namely, that there a saving revelation;

a leader with few followers: maurice creasey

• 43

a leader with few followers: maurice creasey

• 43

there is an approach from the reality to which we give the name God; and that it
embraces every human being... That there is such a divine, saving activity seems to me
absolutely fundamental to anything that can be called Quakerism now or in the future.”
Second, that the historical Jesus Christ is the divine image that grounds revelation. And
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not another. He will never be left behind; he will encounter us all at the end.” These
three dimensions of the central Quaker theological problem concern the nature of divine
revelation, and how revelation becomes effectual. Creasey, “Rethinking Quakerism,”
406-407.
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of revelation as divine disclosure given in historical particularity.
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